HISTORY OF THE CRASH OF ARMY 18007,
16 MARCH 1969,
NEAR PHU BAI, SOUTH VIETNAM
DAVID ROSCOE SMITH, PILOT, AIRCRAFT COMMANDER:
Remains identified 07/2005
Name: David Roscoe Smith
Rank/Branch: O3/US Army
Unit: Command Aircraft Company, 210th Aviation Battalion, 12th Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade
Date of Birth: 02 November 1939
Home City of Record: Dayton OH
Date of Loss: 16 March 1969
Country of Loss: South Vietham
Loss Coordinates: 161357N 1074448E (YC936965)
Status (in 1973): Missing In Action
Category: 4
Acft/Vehicle/Ground: U21A
Refno: 1407
CHARLES RONALD BARNES , CO–PILOT:
Name: Charles Ronald Barnes
Rank/Branch: O3/US Army
Unit: Command Aircraft Company, 210th Aviation Battalion, 12th Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade Date of Birth: 21 August 1942 (Philadelphia PA)
Home City of Record: Fullerton PA
Date of Loss: 16 March 1969
Country of Loss: South Vietham
Loss Coordinates: 161357N 1074448E (YC936965)
Status (in 1973): Missing In Action
Category: 4
Acft/Vehicle/Ground: U21A, serial # 66-18077
Refno: 1407
Prior Military Assignments:
4 JAN 67 - Instructor, SA weapons Department, Co I, USAIS, Ft. Benning GA.Other Personnel In Incident: Raymond E. Bobe; Marvin L. Foster; David R. Smith [CAC]; Michael L. Batt (all missing)
REMARKS:
Source: Compiled from one or more of the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews. Updated by the P.O.W. NETWORK in 2001 with material from the Library of Congress and Lew Schmidt.
SYNOPSIS: On 16 March 1969, Captain Charles Barnes, co-pilot and Captain David R. Smith, aircraft commander were aboard a U21A aircraft which departed Long Trahn, North Army Airfield, South Vietnam. The aircraft made two stops, one at Long Binh and the other at Qui Nhon. At Qui Nohn the plane picked up the following passengers: SP4 Michael Batt, Major Marvin L. Foster and PFC Raymond Bobe. The aircraft resumed its journey north toward Hue/Phu Bai where it was scheduled to land. During this portion of the mission, the aircraft was required to revert from visual to instrument flight rules because of the low cloud ceilings, poor visability and rain showers in the area. The aircraft was picked up by radio and radar; however contact was lost during the approach pattern. After loss of contact, all standard emergency radio frequencies were utilized, but radio contact with the aircraft could not be regained. Da Nang Air/Sea rescue was also notified, but initial efforts were limited to a communications search because of the bad weather. The aircraft was never located. Based on a replotted flight plan, the indicated last known location for this aircraft was approximately one kilometer west of Truoi Mountain, Quang Nam Da Nang (formerly Tuan Thien Province) Province, South Vietnam.
The U21 is a medium-sized aircraft, built to hold 8 or 10 passengers and crew. The U-21A was a fixed-wing, twin-turboprop-engined Beech Aircraft airplane, the military version of the civilian Beech Queen Air aircraft. It was used mainly by the Army, to a lesser extent by the Air Force, generally used for VIP or commutes rather than surveillance or combat support missions.
Batt's photograph was selected as a known prisoner from the JCRC photo album of those missing, but the U.S. Government states that it is unknown why the source selected Batt's photo. Returning POWs did not indicate that any of the crew or passengers had been held with them in their prison system.
When 591 Americans were released from Vietnamese prisons in 1973, high-ranking military officials were shocked that "hundreds" who were expected to be released were not.
Examination of intelligence reports suggest that there was more than one prison "system" in Vietnam. Those prisoners who were released were maintained in the same systems. If the missing men aboard the U21A were captured and kept in another system, the POWs who returned would not know it.
Now, nearly 20 years later, men like these are all but forgotten except by friends, family and fellow veterans. The U.S. "priority" placed on determining their fates pales in comparison to the results it has achieved. Since the U21 A was lost, nearly 10,000 reports have been received by the U.S. relating to Americans still missing in Southeast Asia. Many authorities believe that hundreds remain alive, waiting for their country to come for them. Whether the men aboard the U21A are among them is not known. What is certain, however, is that we, as a nation, are guilty of the abandonment of nearly 2500 of our best and most courageous men. We cannot forget, and must do everything in our power to bring these men home.
In 1988, "material" was provided the United States Government that correlated with Captain Barnes. Additionally, the area where this "material" was reportedly found (Hue) generally correlates with the last known location of Captain Barnes’ aircraft. Some reports label this a "dog tag" report, while others mention remains. As of 1999, the crew and all the passengers remain unaccounted for, listed as presumed dead/body not recovered.
Update: June 15, 2005:
COMMENTS:
Subject: Re: MIA Vietnam
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2000 09:22:07 EST
From: LewSchmidt@aol.com
Hi,
Thought you might enjoy this preliminary edit of the hundreds of pages of information I've gathered. The next most important step is to try and find a detailed topographical map of the Da Nang and Hue area and plot the flight's route from the radio transmissions and try to find the mountain where it probably crashed.
Any ideas are welcome.
OVERVIEW
On 16 March 1969 an "olive drab" (military color) 1966 U21A aircraft, engine type PT6A-20, Serial Number 66-18007 (tail), USARVFLT, departed Long Thanh North Army Airfield at approximately 0705 hours, or, according to another source {E10}, 2305Z hours, on a priority passenger aircraft mission USARV number 21-2 with pilot Capt. Richard R. Smith and co-pilot Charles R. Barnes. They were enroute to Hue/Phu Bai, with stops at Long Binh and Qui Nhon.{E10} "Both aviators were qualified in U-21A type aircraft and are instrument rated."{E44}
The plane was part of "Command Airplane Co., 210th Avn Bn, 1st Avn Bde."
The U21 had an airspeed of 190 knots per hour and a passenger capacity of ten persons, plus the pilot and co-pilot.
They picked up five passengers at Sanford AAP at Long Binh, GS-16 Balser (code 6), LTC Mitchell, Maj. Marvin L. Foster, SP4 Michael L. Batt and Pfc Raymond E. Bobe, along with Batt's dufffel bag, listed on passenger list as A, B, C, D, E, and F. SSG Nolan C. Lockwood testified to seeing SP4 Batt "seated out front of the operations shack...[with] his personal belongings" at Sanford Airfield waiting for transportation. SP5 Scott M. Sutton testified, "I drove the detachment vehicle to Stanford [sic] Airfield, Long Binh Post" with Maj. Foster and PFC Bobe as passengers, and observed them both board the airplane with personal baggage.{E47-48}
Listed on the flight plan and schedule with times of arrival and departure were Long Thanh, Vung Tah 0705-0720, Long Binh 0740-0900, Qui Nhon 0915-1015, Hue Phu Bai 1015 (loss occured), Qui Nhon CXL 1300-1335, Nha Trang 1350-1420, Phan Thiet 1435-1505, Long Binh, DnLat Camlu 1615-1700, Long Binh 1710-1725, Vung Tah, Long Thanh. During the projected trip to Hue Phu Bai and return thirteen passengers were to be transported to various stops, including "DUFFLE BAG" and "VEGS."
The scheduled start and stops were: Long Thanh, Vung Tau (0705), Long Binh (0720-0740), Qui Nhon (0900-0915), Hue Phu Bai (1015), Qui Nhon (CXL 1380), Nha Trang (1335-1350), Phan Thiet (1420-1435), Long Binh (1505), DnLat Camly (1615), Long Binh (1700-1710), Vung Tau (1725), Long Thanh.
During this flight, "mission USARV 21-2", the plane would be identified in radio transmissions with traffic controllers as "Long Trip double 0 seven" (Long Trip 007), and the incident of loss would be known as "REFNO 1407". During this flight toward Hue/Phu Bai they would make too stops, one at Long Binh and the other at Qui Nhon.
The aircraft proceeded to Sanford AAP at Long Binh where it picked up five persons, SP4 Michael L. Batt, GS 16 Balser (code 6), LTC Mitchell and two others not identified by this source (excluded data, but probably Maj. Foster and PFC. Bobe) at 0730 hours. The plane left Sanford at 0740 hours.
It proceeded to Qui Nhon where Balser and Mitchell disembarked at approximately 0900 hours. It was reported that the aircraft departed Qui Nhon with Smith, Barnes, Foster, Batt and Bobe, and continued north towards Hue Phu Bai where it was scheduled to land at approximately 1015 hours.
Because of weather conditions, they were required to revert from visual to instrument flight rules because of the low cloud ceilings, poor visibility and rain showers in the Da Nang/Hue area. Although in radio contact with controllers, contact was lost during the approach pattern to Phu Bai airfield and contact was not regained. The aircraft was lost at 1041 hours (10:41 AM), also reported as "1015 hrs" and position of last radio contact was "16-17N 107-40E at which Long Trip 007 was told to turn left to 090 degrees and climb to 3000 feet. This transmission was not acknowledged and subject aircraft was not identified on radar. Therefore it is not known if Long Trip 007 executed the turn. Later information stated the aircraft was handed off from the GCA to Hue Approach Control at 1036 hours, and "after 5 minutes of radio contact, no further transmissions were received". "Long Trip 007 allegedly failed to respond to radar corrections" and was ordered to return to Phu Bai Approach Control for assistance.
Long Trip 007's last radio transmission was to Phu Bai Approach Control giving its position as SE of Phu Bai heading south at 2000 feet, in the vicinity of some high mountains where they could have crashed on a mountain side. The forward visibility at 2000 feet was zero in the Phu Bai area.
Radio Transmission Transcript Da Nang Rapcon Departure Control:
007— Hue Departure, Long Trip double O seven, double O seven
Dept— —Long Trip double O seven, this is Da Nang Departure, go ahead.
007— Ah roger, references showing the zero six zero, approximately two zero on the Sierra Foxtrot, reading point zero, would like a handoff to Hue Approach Control.
Dept— Double O seven, squawk one zero zero zero, ident; and understand you are at flight level eight zero.
007—Roger, at eight zero, ident.
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, say your radial and DME again, please.
007— Negative radial and DME, we're on the zero three zero now of the Sierra Foxtrot, approximately zero five miles.
Dept—Roger Long Trip double O seven, have radar contact seven miles northeast of airport, remain V?R conditions.
007—We're popeye at the present time
007—Departure, Long Trip double O seven, did you copy, we're popeye.
Dept Long Trip double O seven, roger, maintain flight level eight zero.
007— Roger
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, you're cleared to the Hue Airport via point Alpha, report intercepting [word was difficult to read] the three four three radial from DaNang, over.
007— Report the three four three, roger.
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, report your Point Alpha estimate.
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, DeNang Departure, say your Point Alpha estimate.
007— Estimating Point Alpha at two three
Dept— Ah, roger, two three
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, squawk low please
007— Double O seven, low
007— Long Trip double O seven is three four three, eight thousand
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, roger
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, squawk zero one zero zero, ident, for Hue
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, ident again, please
007— Ident
Dept— Long Trip double O seven, contact Hue Approach Control on three
seven four point one, over.
007— Three seven four point one
End of transcript
Radio Transmission Transcript Hue GCA GCA-Controller, GCA-Approach, APP-Coordinator, Coord-Tower:
GCA— Go ahead approach
APP— Ten and a half mile east, heading two two zero, he's a Long Trip double O seven....level at two thousand.
GCA— You say double O seven?
APP— Right
GCA— OK James Bond
GCA— OK, two forty six eight, November Lima
APP— OK, you got 'em?
GCA— Right, radar contact
APP— Juliet, Juliet
007— Hue GCA, Long Trip double O seven
GCA— Long Trip zero zero seven, this is Marine Hue GCA. I hear you loud and clear, how me, over.
007— Loud and clear
GCA— Radar position, nine miles east of airport
GCA— Zero zero seven, say your present altitude
007— Two thousand
Coord Wow!
GCA— (not keying) say again
Coord Two thousand! He's that high?
GCA— How long, how high did you say he was, I didn't hear you. Coord Two thousand
007— Hue GCA Long Trip zero zero seven, I'm showing at one zero sero of the Echo Victor Beacon
GCA— Zero zero seven, roger, this will be a no gyro approach, turn left, make turns standard rate.
GCA— Zero zero seven, preclude minima; two hundred forty nine feet, one half mile, acknowledge.
007— Roger
GCA— Zero zero seven, if runway not in sight at precision minima, turn right heading three six zero....
Tower— Go ahead
Coord— Long Trip zero zero seven, a U-twenty one, six miles
Tower— OK, check three
Coord— OK
GCA— Zero zero seven, stop turn
GCA— Zero zero seven, say your BME
007— Zero zero seven, negative BME
GCA— Zero zero seven, say your approximate position from the airport
007— Zero zero seven, I have no idea
GCA— Contact Approach Central, three seven four decimal one, GCA standing by.
007— Roger GCA— Tell Approach Control that.
Coord— OK
Tower— Continue
Coord— Hey, uh, tower
Tower— Yeh
Coord— OK, we don't have him yet, we run him back to approach, we lost him
Tower— OK, thank you
Time pause of approximately two minutes.
Coord Hot line....Hot line
GCA— We're going to need another qualified controller
Coord OK
GCA— Go ahead
APP— GCA
GCA— OK, go ahead
APP— OK, zero zero seven, I don't know where the hell he is now
OK, your next one is Spare 862
End of transcript
Radio Transmission Transcript Hue Approach:
APP— Ten and a half east, heading two two zero is Long Trip double O seven, level at two thousand.
GCA— Did you say double O seven?
APP— Right
GCA— OK, James Bond, OK, two forty six point eight, November Lima
APP— OK, you got em?
GCA— Right, radar contact
APP— Juliet Juliet
Transcript continued after the aircraft returned to approach frequency (elapsed time 2 minutes 37 seconds)
APP— Go ahead GCA
GCA— Yes, we lost Long Trip zero sero seven, he's coming back to you
APP— They got him, Charlie Echo
GCA— OK
APP— Go ahead GCA
GCA— OK. This ah is Lieutenant Goodale, what's going on out there? What, what's the scoop with zero zero seven? What do you know? Do you have him on radar?
APP— Yes sir, we do.
GCA— OK, well, I was the one who just took that handoff and, ah, I understand he was about seven miles when I took the handoff, is that the one?
APP— He was about nine and a half, ten miles, when he was switched to you, yes sir.
GCA— Well, right now he's about four or five miles in there, OK? Well, I got the handoff, he was about two thousand, he was high, he did not take my turns. Now you have more than one aircraft east of the airport right now you're working.
APP— That we're working, yes sir.
GCA— You do?
APP— Uh huh.
GCA— I think this is a possible mess, I did, or anyway, bring him around again for another handoff and, ah, back to you, cause I wasn't sure of the, ah, target and I am sure you had him.
APP— Did you give him a missed approach?
GCA— Yes, I have him, ah, three sixty at thirty five hundred.
APP— All right sir, thank you.
GCA— OK
End of this transcript
Radio Transmission Transcript Hue Approach-Control:
007— Hue Approach, Long Trip double O seven
Cont— Double O seven, roger, I have radar contact one four miles east of the airport. Verify level at eight thousand.
007— Eight thousand
Cont— Roger, turn right heading three six zero, descend and maintain two thousand for victors to precision final approach course to runway seven. Hue weather; estimated seven hundred broken, fifteen hundred overcast, seven miles, winds; two eight zero at one zero, altimeter estimated three zero zero nine.
007— Roger, copy
Cont— Nine five four, Hue
This aircraft transmitted to controller three times and the controller transmitted four.
Square six nine eight transmitted to approach five times.
Nine five four and the controller transmitted one each again.
Cont— Roger double O seven, say your passing altitude
007— Through six five
Cont— Roger six position one four miles northeast
007— OK
Cont— Long Trip double O seven, if you hear no transmissions received one minute this victor, or five second on final, you are cleared for approach.
007— Double O seven
007— Approach, double O seven
Cont— Double O seven, Hue, go
007— Can we put on request a clearance for immediate takeoff after we land for VPR on top.
Cap two zero eight called approach:
Cont— Long Trip double O seven roger, ah, double O seven, on departure contact Hue departure on two seven three decimal one.
007— Roger
Cont— Talked to Cap two zero eight
Cont— Long Trip zero zero seven turn right heading zero nine zero.
007— Right to zero nine zero
Cont— Long Trip zero zero seven say passing altitude
007— Zero zero seven passing five thousand
Cont— Zero zero seven continue right turn to heading one four zero.
007— Right to one four zero
Approach three transmissions to nine five four, nine five four two transmissions to approach:
Cont— Long Trip double O seven report passing three thousand five hundred.
007— Double O seven, roger
Transmission undreadable
Cont— Calling Hue, say again
Six six zero transmitted to approach and controller transmitted to six six zero:
Cont— Long Trip double O seven, your position one seven miles northeast.
007— Double O seven through three five, say altimeter
Cont— Ah, roger, altimeter three zero zero niner
007— Roger
Controller transmitted to nine five four twice, nine five four acknowledged twice. Five transmissions to eight six two. Eight six two to controller four times:
007— Zero zero seven level at two thousand
Cont— Roger Long Trip zero two seven, ah zero zero seven, turn right heading two two zero.
007— Right to two two zero
Cont— Long Trip zero seven, position ah fourteen and a half miles east.
007— Roger
Controller two transmissions to eight six two. Eight six two one to controller:
Cont— Long Trip double O seven contact GCA, two four six decimal eight.
007— Two four six eight Eight six two dash two five miles
Transcript continued after the aircraft returned to Approach frequency (elapsed time two minutes three seven seconds):
007— Hue Approach, Long Trip double O seven
Cont— Long Trip double O seven, Hue
007— Can you give us a position fix please
Cont— Ah roger, sir, I believe you are one zero miles east of the airport; squawk zero one zero zero, ident.
007— Ident.
Cont— Double O seven ah say heading
007— Present heading one eight five and we are squawking low at present time.
Cont— Roger squawk normal
007— Normal and ident.
Controller and eight six three each transmitted two times:
Cont— Double O seven negative contact at this time, say your position off sixty nine.
007— Alright, I am showing the one three zero off of victor ah, echo victor. Could you turn us out to sea again, I think we are heading pretty close to these mountains over here.
Cont— Roger, make a left turn to heading zero nine zero
007— Left to zero nine zero
Cont— Double O seven say your altitude
007— Two thousand
Cont— Roger, climb and maintain three
007— Climbing to three
Nine five four and controller five transmissions each;
007— Double O seven level three thousand
Controller and eight six two each transmitted:
The controller attempted contact with 007 seven times after the aircraft reported level at 3000.
All frequencies including guard were used
End of transcript
At some point, the controller seemed to be getting overloaded with involvement and possibly not providing the needed or correct guidance to U21.
Documents alleged that 007 "failed to respond to radar corrections".{E55}
"The aircraft was required to revert from visual to instrument flight rules because of the low cloud ceilings, poor visibility and rain showers in the Da Nang/Hue area.{E10} Weather conditions at 1000 hours were broken clouds at 700 feet, overcast at 1500 feet, visibility six miles in fog, temperature 71F degrees, dew point 69F degrees, winds 280 degrees at 10 knots, altimeter 30.09 inches. By 1100 hours, conditions had slightly improved to 800 feet broken clouds, five miles visibility in light rain and fog, dewpoint 66F, wind at 8 knots, and altimeter 30.11 inches.
When the status of Capt. Smith was changed from missing to presumed dead on 15 Oct. 1973, it was stated that the mountains in the Phu Bai area are 5,000 feet, and with the plane at 3,000 feet "there is a good probabilty that the aircraft crashed into the mountains killing all personnel aboard." The location is "thick foilage and jungle canopy". Elevations confirmed by {E60-61}
Da Nang air/sea rescue was notified, but initial efforts were limited to a communications search because of the bad weather. When the search was initiated, weather conditions were described as "Estimated 700 broken, 1500 overcast, 7 miles visibility in light rain showers. Scattered clouds with an early morning...Ground fog burning off to 6 miles visibility with haze, wind light and variable."
Search missions were conducted by 101st Airborne Division (AM) and also aircraft from the 220th Aviation Company.{E56}
The all day search by aircraft was conducted on 19 Mar. 1969 and was limited by weather conditions and jungle terrain. The area searched was bounded by 16-06N 107-35E to 16-07N 107-26E to 16-22N 107-30E to 16-20N 107-38E to start. DaNang SAR (Search and Rescue) was alerted and assigned at "161900M Mar 69", and their serach would be discontinued on 20 Mar. 1969, no sighting having been made, and XXIV Corps would take over the search on 21 Mar. 1969, "condensed to patterns with terrain elevations of 600 meters or more...Callsign and frequency was established as `Coachman Search Control' on 64.95 mc". The second search effort was terminated at sundown 24 Mar. 1969 (search coordinates provided). All sightings were prior known crash sites.
Intelligence was unable to identify any enemy activity in the immediate area that may have involved 007.
Based on a replotted flight path, the indicated last known location of the plane was in the vicinity of grid coordinates YC 936965{E10}, approximately 30 km southeast of Hue. One source reported that the remains and dog tags relative 007 were found at a crash site within 20 kilometers of the last known location of the plane.
Another location was given as 15 kilometers west–southwest of Phu Loc and eight kilometers north-northeast of Nong Truong Hai Dong, Thua Thien-Hue Province {E5}; or one kilometer west of Tuoi Mountain, Quang Nam-Da Nang (formerly Thua Thien) Province, Vietnam. On 24 Jul. 1975 coordinates were changed from YD760241 to YC936965 based on a plotted map attached to report of proceedings by investigating officer 14 Apr. 1969.{12} Also "southeast of Phu Bai, heading south at an altitude of 3,000 feet."{E62-63} Crash site 48QYC936065, Lat/Long 161358N1074449E.{E9}
"The aircraft executed a missed approach", later changed to "During radar vector". The area where the aircraft was lost was also reported as "CAC Long Thanh North RVN". One document included "LYD 760 241 Thua Thien [coordinates & province] (02) I CTZ RVN. Unknown if status is the result of hostile action".
"The hostile threat in the area precluded any visits to or ground inspections of the sites involved."{E10} Intelligence sources provided no additional information.{E55}
"A former resident [possibly Nguyen Van Mai] of Vinh Hien Village, Phu Loc District (also reported as Binh Tri Thien Province), reported that while searching for incense wood on Loc Thuy Mountain (ZC 1694) he and his uncle found the wreckage of an aircraft that had hit the side of the mountain. He reported they recovered remains (assortment of small human bones) and two identification tags with the inscribed names of [Bobe] and David Smith...Ho Chi Minh City Public Security officials confiscated" the material in May 1986 and the source was given a receipt, and the remains and tags were repatriated 6 Apr. 1988. The remains could not be proven to be any of the men on 007. {E5-6 & E85-86}
The resident stated they "came upon the wreckage of an aircraft that had hit the side of the mountain (source was unable to provide an exact location of the crash site). The aircraft was totally burned, and pieces of the aircraft were widely scattered from the point of impact down the side of the mountain. He could not identify the type of aircraft and saw no identifying numbers or symbols, but found the bones and dog tags of Smith and Bobe. He placed the bones in two small nylon bags about the size of a cantaloupe{E85}, which were later confiscated by authorities and turned over to the US.
Another source reported discovering in late 1980 or early 1981 "a number of items, including two dog tags" near the forest edge of the Son Thanh National Collective Farms in Tuy Hoa, Phu Khanh. See sketch in file under maps. The items included a small camera, gold colored watch, black plastic portfolio (plastic zip-lock and no handle), and two dog tags on a long chain and short chain and connected together. The briefcase contained approximately 20 pages of type written material, yellowed with age, which were later destroyed when used to start fires at the camp. No skeletal remains or clothing fragments were found at the discovery site. After his arrival at Palawan VRC, he attempted to contact his friend "Duong" in regard to the items but was unsuccessful. The area was an unpopulated forest prior to 1975.{E73} This was an area possibly correlated to the 007 crash site.{E76}
Later reports by a female source related heresay information on 5 or 6 US graves in the Nam Dong area (VIC YC 8786),{E10} possibly related to 007, and wreckage of a C0123 (possibly U21) 30 km southeast of Hue, and two dog tags and personal articles near the Nong Truong Nez (approx. YC 8785), possibly related to 007, and removed from a crashsite on a mountain near a fresh water lake, possibly related to an "intermittent lake located vicinity of ZC 132 984". Also reported was information related to (data) and David Smith in the vicinity of G.C. ZC1694. The source's father claimed to have the remains of three US servicemen. She also provided information from a dog tag rubbing and "social security number", name, service number, blood type and religion.{E10}
Dog tags for Capt. Smith and PFC Bobe were aquired from remains dealers and turned over to the US at the repatriation in Hanoi on 06 Apr. 1988.{E12} Original source has the remains of four individuals "on whom he provided ID media data. A tooth was forwarded as proof."{E10} (originally reported in T88-144)
After the war, near Jan. 1992, and again on 3 and 12 Jan. 1993, a team visited the site in Quang Nam-Danang and Thua Thien-Hue Provinces, at grid coordinates ZC199949, where the source reported the remains and dog tag were found, but technical experts claimed the wreckage found at the scene related to another case, case 1055, which was a resolved incident, although the dog tag matched 007 personnel. "It appears the witness has confused the remains, the material evidence and the crash sites.
In 1997, family members of at least Capt. Charles R. Barnes were contacted for blood samples of females of the family and Charles' sister Mary provided samples of her blood. After providing the samples and not hearing anything, she persued the matter with her Representative but never heard anything, and was told they needed samples for every man on the plane before they could do the tests.
That's just a small part!
Lew
Subject: Re: MIA, Long Trip 007
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2001 16:36:19 EST
From: LewSchmidt@aol.com
Hi,
MIA, aboard Long Trip 007: Capt. David R. Smith, Capt. Charles R. Barnes, Maj. Marvin L. Foster, SP4 Michael L. Batt and PFC Raymond E. Bobe.
My conclusions on the loss of Long Trip 007:
I've finally assembled the maps and plotted the course of Long Trip 007 from the radio transmissions. After being circled by the air traffic controllers at Hue/Phu Bai airfield, in an area ENE of the airfield, apparently when they were handling too many aircraft and did a poor job of control, the pilot and co-pilot realized the mess they were in and asked to be turned out to sea.
They were then traveling south and made the turn east and proceeded toward the Gulf of Tonkin, unfortunately directly in line with Loc Thuy Mountain, the only high elevation in that area along the coast. Thinking they were over water and safe to decrease altitude to get under the cloud cover and relocate their position, they crashed into the mountain which was 592 meters or 1942 feet high.
This was corroborated by a couple of Vietnamese who found some bones and the dogtags of two of the men aboard the plane on Loc Thuy Mountain while searching for incense wood. The area contains the wreckage of several crashes.
Sad! A turn to sea slightly north or south of the position, and they would have cleared to the Gulf. Most unfortunate!!
Lew
CAC Unit Member Comments, 2012:
I read with interest the account of the loss of 007. I was there when it disappeared. Al Duckett was Charlie Barnes’ best friend, and Al flew up there to join in the search. He flew back seat Birddog for a couple of days and also talked to all of the controllers. He said that the GCA controller admitted that he had been tracking another low level VFR aircraft that was transiting the approach course, just passing through, and that he was inadvertently giving 007 course corrections based on the flight path of the other aircraft. That’s why the controller said that 007 had not been following his course change instructions. Actually, I believe that 007 WAS making those changes—which put them out near the mountains. We brainstormed for days as to why Dave or Charlie would not have used the Beacon readout to challenge the controller.
You’ll notice that in the transcript there seems to be a lot of transmissions omitted from the record. For instance, where are all of the course change instructions that 007 was supposed to have ignored? That was a sad day—both were great guys!
BTW—I was also with CAC when 001 landed gear-up at Cam Ranh Bay Army—they were dodging jets, in the rain, bad turbulence, talking to three different controllers, power approach prevented low enough torque to activate the gear–warning horn, etc.. To make things worse, a few weeks later, while 001 was sitting on jacks off to the side of the runway, a Chinook came in and blew it off the jacks and broke the wing spar. I don’t think they ever fixed it.
Max Holt
